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Mental Evolution and the Universal Meaning of Life
Abstract:  Is  a  universal  meaning  of  life  (MoL)  possible?  In  this  paper  I  argue  for  an
affirmative answer: Starting out from the MoL's initial definition as "the active and successful
pursuit of the ultimate end in life (UEiL)" and another initial definition of the UEiL, I first
introduce  four  UEiL and  MoL categories.  In  the  context  of  their  discussion,  I  add  the
elements of non-physical relation and universal scope to the definitions of UEiL and MoL
(sect. 2). After those more general aspects, the discussion turns to the specifics of mental
evolution and evolvedness. In this respect, the concept of traditional organic or physicalistic
evolution  is  expanded  to  one  of  'holistic  evolution,'  a  distinction  between  holistic
evolutionary process, the UEiL of mental evolution and the virtue of mental evolvedness is
established,  and  the  definition  of  as  well  as  the  chain  of  arguments  for  this  paper's
universalistic 'mental evolution account' of the MoL is rounded off (sect. 3).
Keywords: universal meaning of life, ultimate end in life, holistic theory of evolution, mental
evolution, mental evolvedness, quality of consciousness
1. Introduction
Beyond the academic world, Western people clearly have a growing interest in issues of life’s
meaning.  Psychics,  televangelists,  and  self-help  gurus  are  extensively  addressing  them,  but
academic philosophers are not. (Metz 2002, 811)
The above was stated more than a decade ago and the literature on the topic of meaning of
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life (henceforth MoL) has grown since then, with the topic itself becoming more established
as a genuine philosophical  topic.  Despite  those developments,  however,  I  cannot  entirely
shake  the  impression  that  this  topic  is  to  some  extent  still  treated  as  “something  of  a
backwater” (ibid., 782), as “the black sheep of the normative family” (ibid., 811) or, overall,
as something that is not yet taken particularly seriously in current academic philosophy.1 In
my opinion, that state of affairs (wherever it may apply) is rather unfitting and unfortunate,
for  instance  because  “[q]uestions  about  life's  meaning  seem  no  less  manageable  than
questions often raised in other normative contexts” (Metz 2003, 69–70). 
More  importantly though,  the topic of  MoL is  also worthy of  our  attention since
finding a universally acceptable answer to the MoL-puzzle would be immensely beneficial
for all of humankind in many ways: It would, for instance, make it easier for people around
the world to live fulfilled and meaningful and thus better lives instead of lives that are, in a
sense  and  to  a  degree,  ʻwasted’ on  the  attainment  of  comparatively  unimportant  goals.
Additionally, there is also a great unifying and peace-bringing element attached to the MoL,
because if  a universal MoL or a therein contained universal ʻultimate end in life’ (UEiL)
could be found, widely communicated and accepted, this would greatly help with uniting
people around the world in the pursuit of a common goal. This, in turn, would to some extent
prevent human societies (either local or global) from becoming relatively dysfunctional due
to various oftentimes incompatible ends being pursued by various special interest groups in
or acting on those societies.
It is for these and other reasons that the topic of MoL should be treated as a serious
social,  philosophical  and ethical  issue with not  to  be underestimated negative or positive
1 Cf. Wolf 2007a, 6: “Academic philosophers do not talk much about meaningfulness in life” or Metz 2013a,
introduction: “[I]t is only in the last 50 years or so that something approaching a distinct field on the meaning of
life has been established in Anglo-American philosophy, and it is only in the last 30 years that debate with real
depth has appeared.” 
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consequences,  depending  on  whether  the  MoL is  not  known  or  acted  against  (negative
consequences) or known and implemented (positive consequences). As such and given that
we obviously prefer positive over negative consequences and the maximization of the former,
it would only be fitting for us to finally give this elephant in the room the attention that it
deserves, because in order to play a ʻgame’ such as the ʻgame of life’ well (an overall quite
fitting analogy, I believe), it is necessary to understand the greater ends, goals or purposes of
that  game.  Otherwise  there  is  a  very  good  chance  that  the  individual  ʻplayers’ will  just
stumble about rather disorientedly, adopting a lot of ultimately rather insignificant goals and
doing a lot of ultimately rather pointless things, thereby finishing this game without much of
a clue of what it was actually all about or which course of action would most likely have
provided for overall better results in the sense of a more meaningful and fulfilled life. 
These are some of the main reasons why we cannot afford to treat one of the most
fundamentally important questions in the entire history of philosophy or human society as
offhandedly as we used to and still do or why we cannot leave this topic in the hands of
“psychics, televangelists, self-help gurus” and other people of questionable expertise, intent
or even sanity, because there is too much at stake here for all of us, both in terms of potential
benefit and potential loss.2 Instead, qualified professionals in the form of philosophers need to
deal with the topic of MoL since this will greatly increase the probability of finding a fitting
and fulfilling universal MoL.
Regarding this philosopher and this paper and as already largely indicated by the title,
the following main hypothesis will be argued for: 
(I) The universal MoL lies in the active and successful pursuit  of the UEiL of mental
2 Kekes 2000, 23: “If our lives are governed by understanding it, then we shall not only avoid unnecessary
suffering, but enjoy positive benefits.” 
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evolution. 
The account of the UEiL and MoL that will be presented in this paper I will accordingly call
the ʻmental evolution account.’ Earlier influences for this account are (among others) Wolf's
“fitting fulfillment account” (2007a, 20ff) and moreso Smuts' “good cause account” (2013),
but  mostly  the  unnamed  and  in  academic  circles  so  far  relatively  unknown  account  of
Campbell according to which “[t]he evolution of our individuated unit of consciousness is the
point  of  our  existence”  (2007,  399).  Before  presenting  that  mental  evolution  account  in
section 3 though and on a more general note, I will first introduce four fundamental UEiL
categories and distinctions and position this paper’s proposed UEiL in their contexts.
2. Fundamental Categories and Distinctions
In a general sense that still omits mention of any specific answers, I would propose to define
the MoL as “the active and successful pursuit of a highly worthy (or fitting or significant)3
and also fulfilling goal or end.” Given that the UEiL will be defined as that highly worthy and
fulfilling end, however, it is also possible to shorten the above general definition of the MoL
to “the active and successful pursuit of the UEiL.”
The element of “active” is adopted from  Wolf (1997, 213: “meaningfulness in life
arises from engagement in worthwhile activity” or 2007a, 7–8: “the relationship between the
subject and the object of her attraction must be an active one”) or James 2010. To that I also
add “successful” since active pursuit does not automatically lead to success and since actively
pursuing  and  succeeding  is  obviously more  desirable  than  actively  pursuing  and  failing.
Regarding the combination of active and successful, one could also talk of “achievement” (cf.
3 Cf. Wolf 2007a, 6–7, 20ff and Smuts 2013, 548.
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James 2005 or also Brogaard & Smith 2005, 447: “a person must be responsible for his
achievements  in  order  for  his  life  to  be  meaningful”),  but  I  will  stay  with  “active  and
successful” since this is a more differentiated way of putting it.
Moving  on  to  the  elements  of  worthyness  and  fulfillingness,  we  can  also  see  a
connection here in the sense that successfully pursuing worthy goals leads to a feeling of
fulfillment, meaningfulness or, more objectively speaking, meaning in life (MiL). Conversely,
pursuing worthless goals does not lead to fulfillment, but the associated feeling may still be
pleasant or satisfying in a different sense.4 The gradual presence or lack of presence of the
feeling of fulfillment can thus be regarded as an important indicator about whether or not or
to what degree a certain activity acts towards the implementation of the UEiL or not. 
 Overall, it also seems quite clear that the UEiL is the most fundamentally important
part of the MoL. As such and in order to understand or define the MoL, we first and foremost
need to understand or define the UEiL. Taking into account the four previous elements,  I
propose  the  following  general  definition  of  the  UEiL:  “a  highly  pursuit-worthy  and,
especially if  successfully implemented,  fulfilling end that takes precedence over  all  other
ends and that also remains this ultimate end throughout our lives.”5 In order to make this
definition even more specific but also in order to give the discussion of UEiL and MoL a
proper categorial framework or frame of reference, I will introduce four fundamental UEiL
categories or dimensions and position this paper’s proposed UEiL in the context of those
monodimensional categories.
4 Examples for this would be “lying on the beach on a beautiful day, or eating a perfectly ripe peach” (Wolf
2007a, 19): There is nothing “worthy” about these goals or no deeper “fulfillment” in their attainment, but the
associated feeling is generally still  positive in a different and perhaps more superficial sense.  For a similar
distinction also cf. Mill 1863, 11: “Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and
when  once  made  conscious  of  them,  do  not  regard  anything  as  happiness  which  does  not  include  their
gratification.”
5 I hesitate to say “an end for which everything else is a means,” because the active and successful pursuit of
the UEiL is in turn a means for the end of generating positive effects, which are in turn a means for other
positive effects, etc. I am also inclined to believe that its unsuccessful pursuit can already contribute somewhat
to the feeling of fulfillment; thus the addition of “especially.”
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2.1 Existence: Realism/Objectivism vs. Anti-Realism/Subjectivism
The first UEiL category that I would like to discuss is that of existence, with the key question
being “As what does the UEiL exist?” (I am here obviously working on the assumption that
UEiL and MoL do exist somehow, somewhere). The two classical choices in this respect are
realism vs. anti-realism or, as my preferred terms, objectivism vs. subjectivism, i.e. the choice
between subject- or mind-independent vs. subject- or mind-dependent existence of the UEiL.6
In this respect, I lean towards subjectivism but without ruling out an objective existence of
UEiL or MoL . 
This subjectivist inclination is explained as follows: Even if the UEiL were to exist
objectively,  it  would  still  need  to  be  discovered,  understood,  adopted  or  adhered  to  by
subjects  or  subjective  minds.  The  discovery,  understanding,  adoption,  etc.  of  something
objective is thus always subjective, because all of that mental content would cease to exist if
the respective subjects ceased to exist.7 As such, there would always be subjective elements,
epistemological and otherwise, added to an objectively existing UEiL or MoL.8 If, on the
other hand, no such objective existence were to be the case, then these subjective elements of
or about the UEiL or MoL now constitute their entire existence (ʻunderstanding is existence,’
if  you  will;  allusion  to  Berkeley’s  idealist  or  subjectivist  dictum  esse  est  percipi fully
intended). Without being able to tell which one of those two general ontological possibilities
6 For  according  uses  of  “real/realism”  and  “objective/objectivism”  see  e.g.  Joyce  2009,  sect.  1:
“Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner”
or Devitt 1991, 44: “According to these idealists, the entities are not in a certain respect ʻobjective’: they depend
for their existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds.”
7 In  the  respective  ontology  of  understanding  or  mental  content,  including  numbers,  I  am  essentially
following Brouwer’s intuitionism (1975) since that intuitionism is the reasonable middle ground between “the
Scylla of platonism (with its epistemological problems) and the Charybdis of formalism (with its poverty of
content)” (van Atten 2012, sect. 3). Platonism, in other words and in my opinion, proposes too much existence
whereas  formalism or  nominalism propose  too  little existence  about  mental  content,  whereas  intuitionism
(ontologically essentially reducible to subjectivism) avoids falling into either one of those unfitting extremes.
8 Cf.  Wolf  1997,  211,  or  2007a,  7:  “Meaning  arises  when  subjective  attraction  meets  objective
attractiveness.”
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is the case – as a proponent of indirect perceptual realism (cf. Sollberger 2013) and due to
related  epistemic  hurdles  I  do  not  consider  it  prudent  to  make  any particularly  specific
statements about objective reality or ʻstuff’ in it – but with at least the subjectively existing
elements of or about the UEiL and MoL being a certainty, my general and intentionally vague
conclusion is that the scales would appear to be tilted in favor of a subjective existence of
UEiL and MoL (note that this in no way contradicts claims about their universality since that
is a claim about a different and independent category).
2.2 Origin: Naturalism vs. Supernaturalism 
Other fundamental UEiL distinctions can be drawn within the category of origin. Here, the
general choices are between naturalism and a supernaturalism, with the classical examples for
that being a UEiL that is “chosen” by ourselves or, respectively, a UEiL that is “bestowed”
(Metz 2002, 802) by God. Regarding this distinction, my opinion is that we are once again
not in a position to give a decisive answer in favor of either a natural or a supernatural origin
of the UeiL (meaning that both naturalists and supernaturalists should be able to accept my
proposed MoL). Due to greatest possible adequate simplicity principles like Ockham’s Razor
and  due  to  there  being  no  need  for  me  to  reconcile  the  UEiL with  some  preconceived
religious dogmas, I however generally find it preferable to go for a natural origin of the UEiL
if possible. This once again intentionally vague position could accordingly be referred to as
ʻpreference naturalism.’
Just  as  with  the previous  category though,  I  in  the  end see no particular  need to
engage in the discussion of natural vs. supernatural origin of the UEiL either. This is mainly
because respective answers would once again appear to be largely speculative. I, however,
feel  that  the  MoL discussion  should  be  about  more  than  just  such  speculative  matters,
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especially given that such fairly non-speculative points are available, that they make for more
concrete  and certain  results,  and that  this  is  generally  preferable  to  by default  uncertain
speculation. Secondly, also I see no particular need to decide between objective vs. subjective
existence or to decide between natural vs. supernatural origin since all of that allows for a
universal UEiL and MoL9 and since it is that universality that counts in the end (at least for
wisdom-driven philosophers; for philosophical scholars, the priorities may be different). That
being said, I would like to move on to the two other and more important categories where I
have a much more committed opinion.
2.3 Relation: ʻNaturalism’ vs. ʻNon-Naturalism’ 
A third fundamental UEiL distinction can be made within the category of relation, with the
key question being “To what ontological sphere(s) is the UEiL related?” In this respect and
given that the following are not singular doctrines but rather a “family of related but distinct
doctrines” (Ridge 2014, introduction), one could once again distinguish between (a different
sense of) naturalism and supernaturalism, for instance as follows:  “Supernaturalist theories
are views that meaning in life must be constituted by a certain relationship with a spiritual
realm. … In contrast,  naturalist theories are views that meaning can obtain in a world as
known  solely  by  science”  (Metz  2013a,  sect.  2).  While  one  might  generally  find  that
distinction relatively agreeable, I need to object to it for three reasons. 
The first reason for objection is that the terms of naturalism and supernaturalism seem
to  lend  themselves  better  for  the  distinction  within  the  category  of  origin  than  for  the
distinction within the category of relation. Given that it is also theoretically conceivable to
9 Universalism about the MoL or morality in general is classically aligned with objective existence and/or a
supernatural origin, but universalism can just as well be combined with subjective existence and/or a natural
origin: It is for instance conceivable that we can intersubjectively agree on a certain general and common MoL
theme that originates from ʻimpartial reason’ (Darwall 1983, chs. 11–12).
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combine a natural origin with a ʻnon-natural’ relation as well as a supernatural origin with
ʻnatural’  relation,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  use  terms  other  than  “natural-”  and
“supernatural-” when talking about the UEiL’s relation. 
Secondly, Metz’s definition of naturalism and supernaturalism also seems to conflate
different  subcategories  within  the  families  ʻnaturalism’  and  (super-  or  rather)  ʻnon-
naturalism.’ To clarify what  I  mean  by that,  I  would  like  to  point  to  Papineau’s  (2009)
distinction between ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism:10 In my opinion, it
was these  two aspects  that  were conflated  in  the  previous  quotation from Metz (2013a),
because he would seem to have opposed  ontological non-naturalism (“spiritual realm”) to
methodological naturalism (“science,” after all, is about methods). The UEiL or MoL relation
in question, however, is purely about ontology (or metaphysics), meaning that we need to
oppose ontological non-naturalism to ontological naturalism in this context.
Yet what are ontological ʻnaturalism’ and ʻnon-naturalism’ all  about anyway? This
brings us to my third and most important objection against the above as well as the overall
use  of  methodological  and  moreso  ontological/metaphysical  ʻnaturalism’  and  ʻnon-
naturalism.’ By this I am referring to the circumstance that these terms and especially the
latter are little but veiled ways of talking about  physicalism11 and  non-physicalism12 and in
need of being replaced by the according terms if clarity of expression and the eliminative
reduction of unnecessary concepts are part of our overall agenda (something which I believe
10 In  the  context  of  moral non-naturalism  (and  presumably  also  moral naturalism),  Ridge  (2014,
introduction) distinguishes between a semantical, an epistemological and a metaphysical sense of the doctrine,
but for my purposes Papineau’s more general distinction will be more fitting. 
11 I prefer “physicalism” over “materialism” since the latter is more of a social phenomenon and since matter
does not exhaust the physical dimension.
12 Cf.  Putnam 2002, 130-31: “Contrary to Dewey's usage, I am using ʻnaturalism’ and its derivatives as
synonymous with materialism, because regrettably, that is how the word has come to be used.” That use of
naturalism is evident in Papineau 2009, sect. 1, just as the use of non-naturalism as non-physicalism is evident in
Ridge 2014, introduction: “It is also sometimes suggested that non-naturalism is the thesis that moral properties
are  sui  generis and  irreducible...  .”  In  personal  correspondence,  David  Papineau  has  also  confirmed  that
ʻontological naturalism’ indeed boils down to physicalism. 
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should generally be the case). Within the ontological UEiL category of relation we should
thus  not  distinguish  between  confusing  ontological  ʻnaturalism’ vs.  ʻnon-naturalism,’ but
simply between physicalism vs. non-physicalism. 
In respect to the thusly semantically and conceptually clarified third UEiL category of
relation, I now propose a relation to something non-physical, and while I prefer to interpret
that as “mental,” I also leave room to interpret that as “spiritual.” Generally speaking, note
that this non-physical relation as well as the “active and successful pursuit” aspect of the
MoL are at least implicitly affirmed by the overwhelming majority of specific MoL proposals
or suggestions (the following enumeration is limited to allegedly “objectively meaningful”
MoLs): 
[...] transcending the limits of the self to connect with organic unity (Nozick 1981, ch. 6, 1989, chs.
15-16); realizing human excellence in oneself (Bond 1983, chs. 6, 8); maximally promote non-
hedonist goods such as friendship, beauty, and knowledge (Railton 1984); exercising or promoting
rational  nature in exceptional ways (Hurka 1993; Smith 1997, 179-221; Gewirth 1998, ch.  5);
substantially improving the quality of life of people and animals (Singer 1993, ch. 12, 1995, chs.
10-11; Singer 1996, ch. 4); overcoming challenges that one recognizes to be important at one's
stage of history (Dworkin 2000, ch. 6); constituting rewarding experiences in the life of the agent
or the lives of others the agent affects (Audi 2005); making progress toward ends that in principle
can never be completely realized because one's knowledge of them changes as one approaches
them (Levy 2005);  realizing goals that  are transcendent  for being long-lasting in duration and
broad in scope (Mintoff 2008); or contouring intelligence toward fundamental conditions of human
life (Metz 2013[b]). (Metz 2013a, ch. 3.2)
With the exception of Nozick’s proposal  and despite  the great divergence of the specific
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UEiL suggestions, a fundamental common aspect among them appears to be the partial or
complete relation to something non-physical. This non-physical relation is affirmed by our
intuition,  by our  more  reflected  knowledge  and  by our  experience,  because  all  of  those
sources demonstrate that a purely physicalistic relation or materialistic goals (having a big or
ever bigger car, house, income, etc.) cannot possibly yield a proper UeiL. In a way, this is
also demonstrated by the well-known tale of Sisyphus who was condemned to stonerolling
ad infinitum by the Gods of Greek mythology: There is almost universal agreement that such
a life is a meaningless life (cf. e.g. Kekes 2000, 23–24, or Landau 2011), with one of the
main reasons for this conclusion being that Sisyphus’ ultimate end of stonerolling is related to
something purely physical and therefore to something devoid of genuine meaning. Generally
speaking  and  overall,  it  is  therefore  a physicalistic  worldview as  well  as  a  physicalistic
conceptions  of  self  (e.g.  I  am  my  brain/body/genes)  that  are  the  greatest  obstacles  to
understanding the UEiL and to living a meaningful life, because these physicalistic positions
are not only ontologically incorrect in my opinion but also utterly unreconcilable with the
non-physical relation that is necessary for any serious UEiL candidate.
More would need to be said about the refutal of physicalism, but that discussion has
occurred (cf. e.g. Searle 1992, Campbell 2007 or Koons & Bealer 2010) or will largely need
to occur elsewhere due to limitations of space. As such, I will limit myself to two general
arguments in favor of non-physicalism and a non-physical relation of the UEiL, with the first
being the following ʻargument from human nature’: Since we would appear to be primarily
non-physical beings  (e.g.  James 1891/1890,  ch.  X,  Noonan 1989,  Campbell  2007,  Olsen
2010, sect.  3–4, Weinberg 2012) in  a  primarily  non-physical world13 and since the UEiL
needs to be properly related to what we are, it would be unfitting and absurd to relate the
13 Campbell 2007, 350: “We are nonphysical consciousness beings experiencing a virtual physical reality, not
physical beings experiencing consciousness.”
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UEiL to something  physical or materialistic  (e.g. accumulating as much money, power or
worldly possessions as possible in a lifetime), because  these ends do not properly relate to
what we are and because or they do not lead us to where we need to go in our also mental (or
spiritual) evolution (cf. ch. 3). 
That  the  UEiL must  be  related  to  something  non-physical  can  secondly  also  be
inferred from the premises that morality in general is related to non-physical facts and that
UEiL and MoL are inherently moral things and therefore also non-physical (= ʻthe argument
from the nature of  morality’).  The respective first  premise goes  back at  least  to  Hume’s
Treatise and is argued for in the following and sometimes misunderstood14 passage (additions
myself):
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see
if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice.  In which-ever way you
take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other [i.e. no
physical or non-mental] matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you
consider the object [i.e. the physical act of murder or the dead physical body]. You never can find
it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast [or rather “mind”], and find a sentiment of
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a [mental or moral] matter of fact;
… . It lies in yourself, not in the [physical] object. So that when you pronounce any action or
character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a
feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be
compar’d  to  sounds,  colours,  heat  and  cold,  which,  according  to  modern  philosophy,  are  not
14 By “misunderstood” I mean (among other things) that Hume was falsely interpreted as a proponent of the
fact/value dichotomy even though Hume himself actually seems to affirm the existence of (mental) moral facts.
This was already pointed out by MacIntyre 1959, 455: “his interest in the facts of morality” or Hunter 1962, 149
(italics original): “the statement 'Contemplation of this action causes a feeling or sentiment of blame in me' is a
statement of fact” or “it is a central part of Hume's moral theory that moral judgments are statements of fact.”
For other or more recent distinctions between the real Hume and the Hume of legend, see the works of Pidgen,
e.g. 2007.
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qualities in [physical] objects, but perceptions in the mind: (Hume 1896/1739–40, III.I.I, 468–69)
The second premise is that UEiL and MoL are inherently moral or ethical goals, in the sense
of  “the  more  a  life  is  moral,  the  more  a  life  is  meaningful”  (Metz  2002,  798).15 The
conclusion is that UEiL and MoL must therefore also be related to something non-physical or
that  “[m]eaning ... is found outside of the natural world” (Kekes 2000, 23), with ʻnatural’
meaning  nothing  but  physical and  ʻnon-natural’ nothing but  non-physical.  The  necessary
relation for any serious UEiL candidate will thus need to be either partially or fully non-
physical (i.e. mental or spiritual).
2.4 Scope: Invariantism/Universalism vs. Variantism
A fourth fundamental UEiL distinction can be made within the category of quantitative and
qualitative scope, with the key question being “To how many and what kind of subjects does
the UEiL apply?” In respect to the latter qualitative aspect, I am of the same opinion as Smuts
in that I also “see no reason to be speciesist about meaning” (2013, 558): I can think of no
good reason to believe that non-human beings should be excluded from the UEiL of mental
evolution since they too are of essentially the same nature (= the argument from universally
same nature),16 since  they too  are  subjected  to  the  process  of  also mental  evolution  and
devolution (= the argument from universal holistic evolution) and since they too also stand to
benefit from the successful pursuit of the UEiL of mental evolution (= the argument from
15 For a list of authors who support that view, cf. ibid., 798. For other or more recent proponents of that
connection between the MoL and morality, cf. Thomas (2005), Campbell (2007), Wolf (2007a, 42ff), Landau
(2011) or Smuts (2013)..
16 It is still customary to say that we “have” mind or consciousness. That conclusion, however, would appear
to  be  a  result  of  the  homunculus  fallacy and  begs  the  question  of  just  who  or  what  ʻpossesses’ mind or
consciousness.  To  avoid  that  problem,  I  propose  to  adopt  Hume’s  (1896/1739–40,  I.IV.VI)  or  Buddhism’s
doctrine  of  no  self  (Rahula  1974,  ch.  6,  Giles  1993)  or  Campbell’s  (2007)  stance  that  we “are”  mind or
consciousness (cf. this paper, fn. 14).
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universal benefit). Secondly and in respect to the quantitative aspect, there is also no good
reason to believe  that  the UEiL of  mental  evolution does  not  or  should not  apply to  all
humans or to all members of another species because, once again, the same three arguments
apply.  The respective overall  position is  accordingly best  referred to  as (quantitative and
qualitative) invariantism or universalism about the UEiL and MoL, with opposition coming
from various versions of variantism.
In  this  category,  Metz  (2013a)  and  others  primarily  talk  about  subjectivism  and
objectivism,17 but by using these terms for the category of scope, the result appears to be a
conflation  between  the  UEiL categories  of  existence  and scope or,  more  specifically,  an
inappropriate ‘forced double wedding’ of objective existence with universal scope and of
subjective existence with variant scope. The reason for why this is inappropriate is that one
can also conceive of objective but variant UEiLs (e.g. God having specified different UEiLs
for different persons or species), just  as one can also conceive of (purely) subjective but
universal UEiLs (e.g. all subjects agreeing on the same general and variation-allowing UEiL).
This is one of the reasons for why it is untrue that “we must look for an objective feature”
(Wolf 2007a, 15), for something of “independent value” (ibid., throughout the paper) or that
“[a]ny viable  theory  will  be  a  purely  objectivist  theory”  (Smuts’ 2013,  547),  because  a
‘proper’  invariant  or  universal  UEiL  can  also  be  combined  with  its  (inter)subjective
existence.18
That  being  clarified,  I  would  like  to  turn  back  to  the  arguments  in  favor  of
17 Metz  2013a,  sect.  3: “Subjectivists  believe that  there  are  no invariant  standards of  meaning because
meaning is  relative  to  the  subject,  i.e.,  depends on an  individual's  pro-attitudes such as  desires,  ends,  and
choices.  … Objectivists  maintain,  in contrast,  that  there are some invariant  standards for  meaning because
meaning is (at least partly) mind-independent, i.e., is a real property that exists regardless of being the object of
anyone's mental states” or ibid., sect. 3.1: “According to this view [i.e. subjectivism], meaning in life varies
from person to person.”
18 Metz 2002, 795, on Darwall 1983, esp. 164–66: “a state of affairs confers meaning on a life roughly
insofar as all human agents would prefer it to obtain, when reflecting on it from an impersonal standpoint.”
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universalism proper; for practical purposes, I will artificially limit the following to a human
universalism. As a sort of first general argument I would like to point out that universalism
about  the  UEiL seems to  be the  natural  go-to position  in  the  category of  scope not  just
historically (in the sense of “a meaningful life is a God-abiding or morally good life”), but
also  since  we  typically  prefer  clear-cut  and  as-simple-as-possible  answers  and  since
universalism  caters  to  that  a  lot  better  than  variantism.  We  also  see  that  appeal  of
universalism  affirmed  by  the  terms  themselves,  because  “the meaning  of  life”  or  “the
ultimate end in life” are strongly tilted in favor of universalism. Some would perhaps reply
that these terms represent an inappropriate bias towards universalism. My counter to such
objections would be to point out that universalism has always been the first  choice,  that
people only joined the ranks of variantists  (or nihilists)  when they were unable to find a
universal MoL and that “the meaning of life” is more fitting than “a meaning of life” or
“meanings of life.”  
Secondly, there is ‘the argument from universally same nature.’ One of the premises
of this argument is that the UEiL has to properly relate to what we are (which is why a big car
or a fat bank account cannot constitute to a meaningful life, because no one could possibly be
their car or their bank account or, on a more general level, something purely physical). The
second premise is that we all are of a universally same nature: We may have our differences
about  whether  that  nature  is  a  more  mental  or  a  more  physical  one,  but  it  would  be
nonsensical to assume that, say, my nature or personal identity is made up of only mental
stuff and that yours on the other hand is made up of only physical stuff. The conclusion is an
affirmation of the universal scope of the UEiL.
Thirdly,  there  is  ‘the  argument  from  universal  holistic  evolution’ which  already
anticipates the content of sect. 3. In this case, the road to universalism leads via the premises
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that mind-including holistic evolution is a universal process (for all living beings) and that the
UEiL is situated in the context of that universal evolutionary process, with the conclusion
once again being universalism about the UEiL.
Fourthly, there is ‘the argument from universal benefit.’ Here the first premise is that
we should take that general goal as the UEiL from which everyone benefits the most, ideally
without  creating  any losers  (‘the  greater  good without  the  lesser  evil,’ so  to  speak)  and
without that goal somehow becoming too limiting or totalitarian. Quite on the contrary: That
goal is supposed to amount to a great unifying and peace-bringing element for local or global
human societies, because currently, there are different and oftentimes opposed ‘highest’ (and
oftentimes  quite  lowly)  ends  being  pursued  by  different  powers  acting  in  or  on  those
societies, thereby creating a situation where people are often enough working against each
other and hindering each other’s progress. Understanding, communication and acceptance of
a universal UEiL, on the other hand, would provide people around the world with a very
fundamental common end to pursue, i.e. with something that would make people cooperate
more with each other across age-related, cultural, educational, ethnological, gender-related,
linguistic, religious or other (perceived) differences or barriers. The second premise is that the
UEiL of  mental  evolution  is  exactly  that  a  goal  of  greatest  universal  benefit,  and  with
everyone  being  able  to  massively  benefit  from  its  active  and  successful  pursuit,19 the
conclusion is once again universalism. 
Fifthly,  there is ‘the argument from universal morality’ (cf. the argument from the
nature  of  morality  in  sect.  2.3).  Here  the  premises  for  universalism are  the  existence  or
viability of a universal ethics or morality (e.g. Williams 1948, Darwall 1983, Bond 1990,
19 Cf. Wolf 2007a, 32: “open to anyone and everyone to […] try to answer”; also cf. Wolf 1997, 212. Seen
that way, one could also claim hybridivism about the category of scope, because the general answer is universal
or invariant, but the specific implementation is variant. To drive home the point that there is a univeral UEiL
though, I will remain with the term of “(general) universalism.”
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Küng 1998, Maior 2013,  Melé & Sánchez-Runde 2013) and the assumption that UEiL and
MoL are inherently part of or related to morality and thus also universal.
Sixthly, a highly indubitable universal UEiL does seem to exist or to be conceivable
(= ‘the argument from existence’), and this would perhaps be the most obvious reason for
rejecting nihilism as well as the ʻlesser nihilism’ of variantism. 
3. Mental Evolution and Evolvedness
In the previous section, the general definition of the UEiL (“a highly pursuit-worthy and,
especially if  successfully implemented,  fulfilling end that takes precedence over  all  other
ends and that also remains this ultimate end throughout our lives”) was made more specific:
While  I  remained  relatively  neutral  and  intentionally  vague  in  respect  to  the  two  UEiL
categories  of  existence  and  origin,  the  components  of  non-physical relation  and
invariant/universal scope were added to the definition in no uncertain fashion. In this section,
I would like to make that definition or account as well as that of the MoL (“the active and
successful pursuit of the UEiL”) even more specific by proposing that this non-physical and
universal  UEiL lies  in  “mental  evolution,”  a  goal  that  I  will  generally  define  as  “the
continuous improvement of mental evolvedness or quality of consciousness” (for the latter
term cf. Campbell 2007). Overall, readers should expect to see a discussion of the following
three distinct but related items: the process of mental evolution and devolution as the for our
purposes more important half of the process of holistic evolution and devolution, the UEiL of
mental  evolution,  and  gradually20 as  well  as  constantly  varying  degrees  of  mental
(d)evolvedness in individuals and groups.
20 Cf. e.g. Landau 2011, 314: “a meaningful life need not be impeccable.”
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3.1 What Evolves?
In the currently widely accepted sense, the process of (d)evolution is typically still limited or
reduced to organic or physical (d)evolution.21 But are we, the subjects and results  of that
ongoing process, indeed reducible to physical stuff like body, brain or genes? In my opinion
and that of other non-physicalists, we are not. Instead, our existence and personal identity and
that of other beings would rather seem to (also) be mind- or consciousness-based (e.g. Hume
1896/1739–40, I.IV.VI., James 1891/1890, ch. X, Noonan 1989, Campbell 2007, Olsen 2010,
sect.  3–4,  Weinberg  2012).  Theories  of  evolution  can  accordingly  not  be  reduced  or
eliminated to mere physical evolution, but will also – and perhaps even primarily – need to
encompass  and  explain  mental  evolution.  This  if  you  will  generally  ‘holistic  theory  of
evolution’ is  not  only supported  by contemporaries  in  various  versions  (e.g.  Jablonka &
Lamb 2006, Campbell 2007, Wilson et al. 2014), but already by 19th century well-knowns
such as Spencer (1855, 1857, 1861, ch. II, 1862, 1876),22 Darwin (1871),23 Romanes (1883,
1888) or in particular someone like James 1891/1890 or Morgan (1892, 161: “The theory of
organic evolution … needs to be supplemented by a theory of mental evolution”).
The reason why James or Morgan deserve special mention here is that, as opposed to
21 Cf. e.g. the projects of sociobiology  (Wilson 1975, Dawkins 1976; for opposition cf. Rose et al. 1990
[1984] or Kitcher 1985) or evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, Buss 1995 or Daly & Wilson
2005; for opposition cf. Looren de Jong & Van der Steen 1998, Panksepp & Panksepp 2000 or Buller 2005).
22 In Spencer 1855, there is only mention of “the evolution of a consciousness” (§100, 324 and §170, 501). In
Spencer 1857, mental evolution is once again only implied or circumscribed by terms and expressions such as
“the evolution of civilization” or “social evolution” (453), “the evolution of all products of human thought and
action” (456), “the evolution of languages … words, and … speech” (457), “the evolution of Science” (464),  or
“the  evolution  of  Humanity”  (465).  In  Spencer  1861  and  his  later  works,  “mental  evolution”  is  finally
mentioned explicitly. It should perhaps also be stated that Spencer has used the term “evolution” earlier and
more frequently than Darwin (an electronic word search  has  revealed  only ten  mentions of  “evolution” in
Darwin’s Origin of 1859 as well as in Darwin 1871) and that Spencer also used “evolution” in a sense that in
my opinion rather inappropriately went far beyond the mental and organic/physical evolution of life (cf. Spencer
1857, 446–47).
23 Cf. ibid., I.I.II., 51: “To maintain … that no animal during the course of ages has progressed in intellect or
other mental faculties, is to beg the question of the evolution of species,” or ibid., I.I.IV., 107: “In order that an
ape-like creature should have been transformed into man, it is necessary that this early form, as well as many
successive links, should all have varied in mind and body.”
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Spencer (James 1891/1890, ch. VI., 147–49), ʻDarwin’s bulldog’ T. H. Huxley (Morgan 1892,
164)  or  Romanes  (1883,  ch.  3),  James  or  Morgan  did  not reduce  or  eliminate  mental
existence to physical existence or mental evolution to physical evolution.24 It is in this non-
physicalistic sense  (Campbell  2007,  663:  “Consciousness  is  fundamental”)  that  both  the
process of evolution as well as the following proposed UEiL is to be understood.
3.2 Why Mental Evolution and Evolvedness?
The UEiL was placed in a holistic evolutionary context. So then why adopt mental evolution
as the UEiL and not holistic evolution? This choice or that of an according non-physical or
mental relation (sect. 2.3) is primarily a result of my take on personal identity (sect. 3.1)
which, in turn, is a result of more general ontological convictions: If our identity or existence
in general could be reduced to purely physical stuff, then an evolution-related UEiL could
conceivably also be reduced to the ultimate goal of physical evolution. Such an ʻeugenical’
conception of an evolution-related UEiL, however, would not only be historically tainted but
also metaphysically or ontologically incorrect since personal identity (Hume 1896/1739–40,
I.IV.VI.,  James 1891/1890,  ch.  X,  Noonan 1989,  Campbell  2007,  Olsen 2010,  sect.  3–4,
Weinberg 2012) or existence in general cannot be reduced to physical stuff just as evolution
cannot  be reduced to organic/physical  evolution.  Instead,  existence,  personal  identity and
evolution are partially or even primarily mental or mind-related (or so my claim). Any UEiL
that takes into account that fundamental nature of existence, of ourselves and of a likewise
(d)evolutionary  process  will  thus  also  need  to  be  partially,  primarily  or  perhaps  even
exclusively mind-related, for otherwise it would be ontologically inconsistent or at odds with
24 Cf. James 1891/1890, ch. VI., 149: “If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must
have been present at the very origin of things,” Morgan 1892, 164: “Consciousness is something sui generis. It
is neither matter nor energy,” or ibid., 172–74.
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related ontological convictions.25
Regarding the general direction of the proposed UEiL of mental evolution, I would
once again like to point out the connection between the MoL/UEiL and morality in the form
of  the  direct  correlation  and  maxim  that  “the  more  a  life  is  moral,  the  more  a  life  is
meaningful” (Metz 2002, 798): I believe that this premise is true, and together with the other
presumably true premise of mental evolution being that UEiL, the conclusion is that the UEiL
of mental evolution is to be understood as a perhaps not exclusively but  primarily moral
mental evolution.26
For the description of the current status of an individual or group in regard to the
UEiL or MoL, I suggest to use the in both cases gradually sensitive terms of “quality of
consciousness” (QoC; Campbell 2007) or “mental (d)evolvedness”: If such an entity is doing
well in respect to the active and successful pursuit of the UEiL of mental evolution, that
entity can be regarded as being of a relatively high QoC or as being relatively mentally
evolved. If, on the other hand, individuals or groups are not doing well in respect to that
MoL, then they can be regarded as being of a relatively low QoC or as being relatively
mentally devolved or underevolved. 
Note  that  the  overall  answer  of  mental  evolution  and  evolvedness  can  also  be
understood as an elaboration and specification of Smuts’ good cause account of the MoL
according to which “one’s life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good” (2013,
536). This is because the how-to is provided for by Campbell's or my own mental evolution
25 By stating that  the MoL is to be found in “contouring intelligence toward fundamental  conditions of
human life” (Metz 2013a, sect. 3.2, on Metz 2013b) and given that holistic evolution is a fundamental condition
of human life, Metz in a sense also confirms Campbell’s (2007, 399: “The evolution of our individuated unit of
consciousness is the point of our existence”) or my own proposed UEiL of mental evolution.
26 Cf. (Metz 2003, 60–61) or Landau (2011, 314) for statements to the effect of there also being morally
unrelated or neutral ways of how mental evolution can occur. That, however, does not change anything about the
widely held opinion that “immoral lives cannot be meaningful” (Landau 2011, 316) or that mentally evolved
individuals generally act in a morally right way.
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account: One can reliably be a cause of good effects by becoming a being of relatively high
QoC which in turn can be achieved by actively and successfully pursuing the UEiL of mental
evolution.27
3.3 Defining (Moral) Mental Evolvedness
In this chapter and after previous discussion has been about the process holistic and mental
(d)evolution and moreso about the UEiL of mental evolution, I would now like to set aside
those two items and concentrate solely on the third one of mental evolvedness or quality of
consciousness. Since this is not only a concept but also a concrete quality in beings, I will go
about this both in terms of a general ‘patchwork’-definition of that term as well as in terms of
answering the question of how one can recognize the relative presence or lack of that quality
in a being or ʻindividuated unit of consciousness’ (IUoC). 
First  of all  and as stated by Campbell  (2007,  255,  351)  or  as  pointed out  by the
philosophy of  Buddhism (Rahula  1974,  ch.  V),  the arch-philosophical  quality of  wisdom
appears to be an inherent part of such (moral) mental evolvedness. This can be demonstrated
by pointing out that it would be highly unfitting to regard an individual as wise and at the
same time as mentally underevolved or, given that MoL and UEiL are embedded in a moral
context, as wise and at the same time as immoral. Instead, the quality of wisdom always
seems to imply a high degree of mental evolvedness as well as high standards of morality,
thus  making  it  a  prime  aspect  of  the  definiens  for  the  definiendum  of  moral  mental
evolvedness.
Furthermore, general  motivations and specific  intentions (Campbell 2007, 414) also
27 Also cf. Thomas 2005, 406: “being psychologically healthy is more morally normative than one might
suppose.” The premises here are that it is our moral duty or the point of our existence to do good and that being
psychologically healthy – or having a high QoC – is a necessary requirement for being able to do so.
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reflect an individual’s QoC: If individuals are motivated to a high degree by greed, hate or
other vices or ‘mental poisons’ (Rahula 1974) and driven by the intent to materialistically
enrich themselves without end or to ruthlessly destroy other people or even entire countries
(what was formerly known as Iraq, Libya or the currently failing state of Ukraine come to
mind), then that points to an underevolved QoC. Mentally highly evolved individuals, on the
other hand, have largely transcended these vices and are instead motivated by virtues, with
specific intentions being of a likewise nature.
On a somewhat  different  level  but  relatedly,  one can also point  to  the criteria  of
awareness of choices and choices made: Given the same situation, a mentally more evolved
being or IUoC will be aware of better choices than a less evolved IUoC, and it will also make
the better choices. This also caters to the Aristotelean concept of akrasia or weakness of will
in the sense that one may be evolved enough to be aware of better possible choices, but not
yet evolved enough or mentally too weak to actually implement those choices. 
Relatedly, the degree of mental evolvedness could also be defined or explained with
the aid of the category of mental order and chaos, with ordered standing for evolved and
chaotic  for  unevolved.  In  this  context  and  no  doubt  due  to  his  training  as  a  physicist,
Campbell  uses  the  term of  entropy,  with  “high(er)  entropy”  denoting  low(er)  QoC and
“low(er) entropy” denoting high(er) QoC (the following is essentially representative of my
own opinion):
Higher entropy states within consciousness represent unprofitable organization: disorganization,
fears,  […]  dimness,  diminished  potential,  self-centeredness,  and  an  inability  to  understand
complex interrelationships or see big pictures. Higher entropy results in consciousness systems
having  less  power  that  can  be  applied  to  overcome  the  inertia  of  ignorance  and  ego
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dysfunctionality. Not decreasing the entropy of consciousness results in a squandering of potential.
The fewer internal dysfunctional constraints […] that limit a particular consciousness, the lower
its associated entropy and the more effectively it can populate the most profitable states available
to it. The drive or urge to be helpful to, and care about others (love) is an innate property of low
entropy consciousness. A low entropy consciousness is an effective and powerful consciousness.
(ibid., 441)
To perhaps conclude this section with a general functional definition of QoC and mental
evolvedness:  A  relatively  low  QoC is  the  fundamental  human  cause  for  morally  and
otherwise bad consequences, whereas a relatively high QoC is the fundamental human cause
for morally and otherwise good consequences. Seen that way, QoC or mental evolvedness is
certainly a  virtue  and in  my estimation  most  likely even the  one  unitarian  virtue  (for  a
discussion of the unity of virtue thesis, cf. e.g. Penner 1973, Wolf 2007b or Toner 2014). 
3.4 The Importance of (Moral) Mental Evolvedness
I believe there are few things that are as impressive as consequences (of whatever). In order
to drive home the importance of the active and successful pursuit of the universal  UEiL of
mental evolution and the according result, quality and human virtue of mental evolvedness or
QoC, I would accordingly like to close with a brief outlook over the consequences of relative
success and relative failure to attain that virtue. Towards that end, I will start by quoting two
further passages from Campbell that are once again representative of how I would describe
the situation (addition myself):
Improving the quality of our consciousness is, and always has been, fundamental to our evolution
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but today it  is  also critical  to our survival  and to the continued success of the Homo sapiens
experiment. If we accomplish a significant improvement in the quality of our consciousness first, if
we can lead with our quality, the rest of our options will be guided by our wisdom and we will leap
boldly ahead. If, on the other hand, the quality of our consciousness lags [...], we will have the cart
in front of the horse, so to speak, and it is going to be a wild and dangerous ride. (Campbell 2007,
225)
On the physical side of the human coin, the Darwinian game of survival and domination of the
fittest  plays  out  in the little  picture  of  PMR [physical  matter  reality,  understood as subjective
phenomenal  reality].  In  a  bigger  picture,  humans  also  have  an  innate  drive  toward  self-
improvement that focuses on the evolution of consciousness. The fact is that in the PMR little
picture, long-term success ultimately depends on establishing a balance between these two modes
of human evolution. 
If  our  drive  to  compete  and  gain  controlling  power  and  knowledge  overwhelms  the
synergistic balance it must have with our drive to improve the quality of our consciousness, we
will eventually unravel our grandest gains in a giant leap backward. If power and wisdom are not
in an effective balance within any self-modifiable system (too much power relative to the wisdom
needed  to  utilize  that  power  for  long-term profitability),  that  system will  eventually  become
unstable and self-destruct in proportion to the degree of the imbalance. (ibid., 351)
In other words and as far as human influence is concerned: There is no other thing besides
mental evolvedness that has or would have as many or as massively positive consequences,
just as there is no other thing besides mental devolvedness or underevolvedness that has or
would have as many or as massively negative consequences. Holistic (d)evolution is also a
naturally  occurring  and  ongoing  process.  To  take  “the  active  and  successful  pursuit  of
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(primarily)  mental  evolution”  as  the  MoL thus  simply means  that  we want  to  maximize
positive consequences while minimizing negative consequences and that we want to do well
in the process of holistic evolution instead of, say, messing things up through various non-
sustainable  ʻdevelopments’ which  can  unfortunately  be  found  aplenty  in  today’s  society
(sustainability is virtue and non-sustainability is vice as far as this author is concerned; cf.
Prakash  1995  or  van  Wensveen  2001).  To conclude  with  another  fitting  and fairly  self-
explanatory quotation from the earlier author:
The external environment for humans is essentially subdued; consequently, we have become our
only major threat. The greatest challenge to our species today is to survive the self-destructiveness
of our own low quality of consciousness. We must now learn to master the internal environment.
(Campbell 2007, 229)
4. Conclusion
It was proposed that “(I) The universal MoL lies in the active and successful pursuit of the
UEiL of mental evolution,” with the initial general definition of the UEiL being “a highly
pursuit-worthy  and,  especially  if  successfully  implemented,  fulfilling  end  that  takes
precedence over all other ends and that also remains this ultimate end throughout our lives.”
In the context  of four fundamental  UEiL categories,  that  definition was then made more
specific by suggesting an inclination towards a subjective existence (sect. 2.1) and a natural
origin (sect.  2.2), by decisively adding a non-physical relation (sect.  2.3) and a universal
scope (sect.  2.4)  to  the UEiL,  and by affirming that  the UEiL is  mainly a  moral  end or
situated in a moral context (sect. 2.3).
In sect. 3, that definition was then rounded off by adding that mental evolution (“the
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continuous improvement of mental evolvedness or quality of consciousness”) is that non-
physical and universal UEiL: It was opined against a purely organic or physicalistic and in
favor of a holistic conception of the process of evolution (sect. 3.1), the proposed UEiL of
mental  evolution  as  well  as  the  according  virtue  of  mental  evolvedness  or  quality  of
consciousness  were  defined,  explained  and  argued  for  (sects.  3.2–3.3),  and  the  great
importance of achieving a high degree of QoC was pointed out (sect. 3.4).
The question of what constitutes a meaningful life or how one can live a meaningful
life can thus be answered in the following manner: If, at the end of an individual life in this
world, an individual has managed to improve its own and typically also the overall  QoC,
thereby invariably being the cause of overall positive effects, then this can be regarded as a
meaningful and morally good life, with the degree of meaningfulness and moral goodness
depending on the amount and degree of QoC evolution and the positive effects caused by
this. If, on the other hand, an individual should have lowered its own and typically also the
overall QoC, thereby invariably being the cause of overall negative effects, then this can be
regarded as an in the negative sense meaningless and morally bad life, with the amount and
degree of meaninglessness and moral badness depending on the amount and degree of QoC
devolution and the negative effects caused by this.
Relatedly  and  in  terms  of  an  outlook  over  future  developments  from  this  point
onwards, I would be inclined to believe that (1) the unity of virtue hypothesis got confirmed
here since we can take mental evolvedness to be that unitarian virtue, that (2) the MoL of the
active and successful pursuit of the UEiL of mental evolution would appear to serve as one of
the measures or indicators of moral goodness and badness (in the sense that something is
regarded  as  good  if  it  promotes  mental  evolution  and  as  bad  if  it  promotes  mental
devolution), and that (3) a non-physicalistic or holistic remodelling of evolutionary theory
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and (4) evolutionary ethics may very well be in order. As already stated though, these are
mainly topics that will need to be discussed in other works, because for the time being I
simply hope that I was able to properly introduce and argue for this paper’s universalistic
mental evolution account of the MoL.
References:
Audi, R., 2005, Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life, Philosophical Papers 34(3), 331–355. 
Bond, E.J., 1983, Reason and Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bond,  E.J.,  1990,  Could  There  Be  a  Rationally  Grounded  Universal  Morality?,  Journal  of  Philosophical
Research 15, 15–45.
Brogaard, B., Smith, B., 2005, On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life, Philosophical Papers 34(3),
443–458.
Brouwer,  L.E.J.,  1975,  Collected  Works  1.  Philosophy and Foundations  of  Mathematics,  A.  Heyting (ed.),
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Buller, D.J., 2005, Evolutionary psychology: the emperor’s new paradigm, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(6),
277–283.
Buss, D.M., 1995, Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psychological science, Psychological Inquiry
6(1), 1–49.
Campbell,  T.W.,  2007,  My  Big  TOE, Lightning  Strike  Books.  http://books.google.at/books?
id=RYHtBPiZVgsC&pg=PA708&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false  .
Daly, M., & Wilson, M., 2005, The ‘cinderella effect’ is no fairy tale, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(11), 507–
508.
Darwall, S.L., 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Darwin, C., 1871, The Descent of Man, London: John Murray.
Devitt, M., 1991, Aberrations of the realism debate, Philosophical Studies 61(1-2), 43–63. 
Dworkin, R., 2000, Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Giles, J., 1993, The no-self theory: Hume, Buddhism, and personal identity,  Philosophy East and West 43(2),
175–200. 
Hume,  D.,  1896  [f.p.  1739–40],  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature, Oxford:  Clarendon  Press.
http://www.archive.org/stream/treatiseofhumann01humeuoft#page/468/mode/2up.
Hunter, G., 1962, Hume on Is and Ought, Philosophy 37(140), 148–152.
Hurka, T., 1993, Perfectionism, New York: Oxford University Press.
Jablonka, E., Lamb, M.J., 2006,  Evolution in four dimensions: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic
variation in the history of life, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
James, W., 1891 [f.p. 1890], The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, London: MacMillan.
27
James, L., 2005, Achievement and the Meaningfulness of Life, Philosophical Papers 34(3), 429–442.
James, L., 2010, Activity and the Meaningfulness of Life, The Monist 93(1), 57–75.
Joyce, R., 2009, Moral Anti-Realism, In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/moral-anti-realism.
Kitcher, P., 1985, Vaulting ambition: Sociobiology and the quest for human nature, MlT Press.
Koons, R.C., Bealer, G. (eds.), 2010, The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press.
Küng, H., 1998, A global ethics for global politics and economics, Oxford University Press.
Landau, I., 2011, Immorality and the Meaning of Life, The Journal of Value Inquiry 45(3), 309–317.
Levy, N., 2005, Downshifting and Meaning in Life, Ratio 18(2), 176–189.
Looren de Jong, H., Van der Steen, W.J., 1998, Biological thinking in evolutionary psychology: Rockbottom or
quicksand?, Philosophical Psychology 11(2), 183–205.
MacIntyre, A.C., 1959, Hume on “Is” and “Ought”, Philosophical Review 68(4), 451–468.
Maior, G.C., 2013, Human Rights: Political Tool or Universal Ethics?, Journal for the Study of Religions and
Ideologies 12(36), 9–21.
Melé, D.,  Sánchez-Runde, C., 2013, Cultural  Diversity and Universal Ethics in a Global World,  Journal of
Business Ethics 116(4), 681–687.
Metz, T., 2002, Recent Work on the Meaning of Life, Ethics 112(4), 781–814.
Metz, T., 2003, Utilitarianism and the Meaning of Life, Utilitas 15(1), 50–70.
Metz,  T.,  2013a,  The  Meaning  of  Life.  In:  Zalta,  E.N.  (ed.),  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/life-meaning.
Metz, T., 2013b, Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mill, J.S., 1863, Utilitarianism. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn.
Miller, A., 2014, Realism, In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/realism.
Mintoff, J., 2008, Transcending Absurdity, Ratio 21(1), 64–84.
Morgan, C.L., 1892, Mental Evolution, The Monist 2(2), 161–177.
Noonan, H.W., 1989, Personal Identity, Routledge.
Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Nozick, R., 1989, The Examined Life, New York: Simon & Schuster.
Olson, E.T., Personal Identity,  In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.),  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010
Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/identity-personal.
Papineau, D., 2009, Naturalism, In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.),  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009
Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism.
Panksepp, J., & Panksepp, J.B., 2000, The seven sins of evolutionary psychology, Evolution and Cognition 6(2),
108–131.
Penner, T., 1973, The Unity of Virtue, Philosophical Review 82(1), 35–68.
Pigden, C.R., 2007, Hume, motivation and “the moral problem”,  Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62(3), 199-
221.
28
Prakash,  M.S.,  1995,  Ecological  Literacy  for  Moral  Virtue:  Orr  on  [moral]  education  for  postmodern
sustainability, Journal of Moral Education 24(1), 3–18.
Putnam, H., 2002, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Harvard University Press.
Railton, P., 1984, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,  Philosophy and Public Affairs
13(2), 134–171.
Rahula, W., 1974, What the Buddha Taught, revised edition, New York: Grove Press.
Ridge, M., 2014, Moral Non-Naturalism, In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.),  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-non-naturalism.
Romanes,  G.J.,  1883,  Mental  Evolution  in  Animals,  London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench  &  Co.
https://archive.org/stream/mentalevolutioninan00roma#page/n5/mode/2up.
Romanes,  G.J.,  1888,  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench  &  Co.
https://archive.org/stream/mentalevolution00roma#page/n9/mode/2up.
Rose, S.P.R., Lewontin, R.C., Kamin, L.J., 1990 [1984],  Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human
Nature, Penguin Books.
Searle, J.R., 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Singer, I., 1996, Meaning in Life Volume 1: The Creation of Value. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Singer, P., 1993, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, P., 1995, How Are We to Live? Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books.
Smith,  Q.,  1997,  Ethical  and  Religious  Thought  in  Analytic  Philosophy  of  Language,  New  Haven:  Yale
University Press.
Smuts, A., 2013, The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life, Southern Journal of Philosophy 51(4), 536–
562.
Sollberger, M., 2013, In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism, European Journal of Philosophy
22(3), 1–23 (Early View).
Spencer,  H.,  1855,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  London:  Longman,  Brown,  Green,  and  Longmans.
https://archive.org/stream/principlespsych04spengoog#page/n12/mode/2up  .
Spencer, H., 1857, Progress: Its Law and Cause, Westminster Review 67(Jan. and April), 445–485.
Spencer, H., 1861, Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical, London: Williams and Norgate.
Spencer, H., 1862, First Principles, London: Williams and Norgate.
Spencer, H., 1876, The Comparative Psychology of Man, Mind 1(1), 7–20.
Thomas, L., 2005, Morality and a Meaningful Life, Philosophical Papers 34(3), 405–427.
Toner, C., 2014, The Full Unity of the Virtues, Journal of Ethics 18(3), 207–227.
Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., 1992, The psychological foundations of culture. In: Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J.
(eds.),  The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, pp. 19–136. New York:
Oxford University Press.
van  Atten,  M.,  2011,  Luitzen  Egbertus  Jan  Brouwer,  In:  Zalta,  E.N.  (ed.),  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of
Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/brouwer.
van Wensveen, Louke, 2001, Ecosystem Sustainability as a Criterion for Genuine Virtue. Environmental Ethics
29
23(3), 227–241.
Weinberg, S., 2012, The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity, Journal of
the History of Philosophy 50(3), 387–415.
Williams, G., 1948, Individual, Social, and Universal Ethics, The Journal of Philosophy 45(24), 645–655.
Wilson, E.O., 1975, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wilson D.S., Hayes S.C., Biglan A., Embry D.D., 2014, Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional
change, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 37(4), 395–416.
Wolf, S., 1997, Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life,  Social Philosophy and Policy 14(1),
207–225.
Wolf, S., 2007a, Meaning in Life and Why it Matters,  Transcript of the  Tanner Lectures on Human Values
delivered at Princeton University in November 2007.
Wolf, S., 2007b, Moral psychology and the unity of the virtues, Ratio 20(2), 145–167.
30
